There is increasing evidence suggesting that Medicare beneficiaries do not make fully informed decisions when choosing among alternative Medicare health plans. To the extent that deciphering the intricacies of alternative plans consumes time and money; the Medicare health plan market is one in which search costs may play an important role. To account for this, we split beneficiaries into two groups -those who are informed and those who are uninformed. If uninformed, beneficiaries only use a subset of covariates to compute their maximum utilities, and if informed, they use the full set of variables considered. In a Bayesian framework with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, we estimate search cost coefficients based on the minimum and maximum statistics of the search cost distribution, incorporating both horizontal differentiation and information heterogeneities across eligibles. Our results suggest that, conditional on being uninformed, older, higher income beneficiaries with lower self-reported health status are more likely to utilize easier access to information.
INTRODUCTION
To the extent that gathering information consumes time and money, not all Medicare beneficiaries will make an informed decision when choosing their health plan. In this paper, we split beneficiaries into two groups -those who are informed and those who are uninformed -as determined by the Medicare Knowledge and Needs survey. We then study the role of demographic variables on whether beneficiaries are informed or not and, conditional on their information structure, analyze which factors determine how close they were to being informed. Our analysis also allows for heterogeneous tastes across beneficiaries for different plan attributes.
When first established in 1997, the Medicare1Choice (M1C) program aimed to provide beneficiaries alternatives to the standard Medicare Fee-for-Service (FFS) plans. Now termed Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, these provide at a minimum the same coverage offered by standard Medicare FFS and often provide much more, but additional health plan benefits also complicate each beneficiary's choice. In shear number, the choice may be daunting. In 2002, private insurance companies received 174 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) contracts to provide 452 different Medicare health plans for different areas across the US. Some beneficiaries had over 60 different plans offered in their area.
Plans can also offer a variety of optional benefits, and although not all plans are available to all beneficiaries, it is clear that the potential choice set is overwhelming for most people. In a study commissioned by AARP, Hibbard and Jewett (1998) find that most beneficiaries do not fully understand the differences between the standard Medicare FFS and M1C plans. More recently, Atherly (2001) , Frank (2004) and Heiss et al. (2006) , among others, present strong survey evidence suggesting that the choice set is overly complicated and that beneficiaries often do not make fully informed decisions.
We account for these informational problems by adopting a consumer search model. With data on Medicare plan choice, beneficiary information structure and demographic variables, we split buyers into groups of informed and uninformed. If uninformed, beneficiaries only use a subset of covariates to compute their maximum utilities, and if informed, they use the full set of variables considered. Intuitively, we can treat all beneficiaries as being initially uninformed, and through costly search, they can gain knowledge of other characteristics; however, since eligibles have different search costs, not all beneficiaries want to search. This search process is similar to Sorensen (2001) , who studies search costs in the market for prescription drugs. Due primarily to data limitations, however, he cannot study the effect of demographic variables on search costs, while in our paper, we parameterize search costs and explicitly estimate search cost coefficients based on the minimum and maximum statistics of the search cost distribution. The main focus of this paper is to explain the primary determinants of these critical search cost values. We estimate this model in a Bayesian framework with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, incorporating both horizontal differentiation and information heterogeneities across eligibles.
Our analysis provides two major contributions.
(1) We embed a heterogeneous search process in a discrete choice model with taste differences. This provides a rich decision process with multiple forms of buyer heterogeneity. (2) We determine not just how beneficiaries gain information (as in the standard reduced form models) but also which types of beneficiaries are closer to making informed decisions than others. Since informed decisions are welfare improving, understanding beneficiary information structure and which beneficiaries are closer to making an informed decision has important welfare implications. Intuitively, imagine we want to assess our favorite sports team's performance. We might first look at wins and losses, which is what the standard reduced form models tell us about a beneficiary's information structure -are beneficiaries informed or uninformed and what factors have the most influence? But there are degrees of winning and losing, and knowing whether our team lost by 1 or 100 points makes a difference. Our search model, in some sense, tells us the score. Specifically, if we consider a search cost cutoff above which people are uninformed and below which are informed, we find that higher income beneficiaries are most likely closer to the cutoff than lower income beneficiaries, while beneficiaries with more assistance are more likely to have search costs well away from the cutoff. These results provide strong insight into who would most benefit from easier access to information and allow us to determine, of those that are uninformed, who needs the least help to make an informed decision. Therefore, with regard to beneficiary information structure, we can ex ante assess the efficiency of proposed welfare improving processes.
Search is certainly not the only avenue by which beneficiaries simplify their choice sets. Gilbride and Allenby (2006) , for example, develop a screening-rule model where beneficiaries choose plans essentially in two stages. In stage one, they select a subset of plans based on a screening rule, and in stage two, they choose the best plan in their new information set. They apply this model to self-reported survey data. Li (2006) extends this by incorporating demographic variables and devoting more attention to the development of the screening rule mechanism. She also applies her model to realized choices rather than survey data of hypothetical choices.
While both papers are important steps in developing more realistic choice models when decisions are complicated, the underlying motivation for the screening rule is somewhat disconcerting. This assumes that people cannot fully understand the intricacies of each choice and are burdened by 'information overload.'
To ease their decision, they screen their choices and only look at some subset. In a search model, however, anyone can understand the options available to them, but the cost of doing so may be substantial. The screening model also does not differentiate between informed and uninformed buyers and, as such, cannot address which types of buyers might be closer to making informed decisions than others.
Moreover, in the Medicare health plan market, there is strong evidence that search may play a role. First, there does seem to be some distinction between informed and uninformed beneficiaries. When asked a series of questions regarding how intensively they tried to find plan information, over half of our sample indicated making essentially no effort. Such beneficiaries could not have made an informed decision -even if the decision were somewhat simplified by a screening rule, they would still have to research whatever plans passed the first-stage screening process. Second, there are significant differences across plans offered to each beneficiary, creating a strong benefit for those beneficiaries deciding to actively research several different plans. For instance, the average difference between the lowest and the highest premium plans offered in a beneficiary's area is over $100. Similarly large differences exist for inpatient hospital care (IHC) costs ($20.11), doctor and specialist co-pay ($13.32), and several services such as vision and hearing. Third, as mentioned previously, many beneficiaries cite a strong lack of understanding with their plan's benefits, implying that they could not have thoroughly researched some of their plan's attributes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the history of the MA program, Section 3 explains the basic search theory, Section 4 explains the data, Section 5 sets up the model, Section 6 explains the estimation process and Section 7 summarizes the results. The Gibbs sampler algorithm and simulation results are deferred to the Appendix.
MEDICARE HISTORY
Established in 1965, Medicare provides baseline medical coverage to individuals 65 years or older or those with permanent disabilities. Until 1982, the only option for Medicare beneficiaries was the basic Medicare FFS, which consists of two parts. All eligibles are automatically enrolled in Part A, which covers hospital stays and skilled nursing facility (SNF) care, and in 2002, roughly 95% of beneficiaries also paid for Medicare Part B, the voluntary supplemental program covering physician services, medical equipment, and most outpatient hospital services. Most beneficiaries have already paid for Part A through payroll taxes, while Part B usually requires an additional premium ($54 in 2002 and $96.40 in 2007) . Since 2006, beneficiaries can also receive prescription drug coverage through private drug plans (Medicare part D).
Since the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, and revised in 2003 by the Medicare Modernization Act, beneficiaries can enroll in private health insurance plans called M1C plans. These plans are provided by private companies who contract with the CMS yearly and are designed to replace the traditional Medicare FFS plans. Contracts apply at the county level, and there can be multiple plans provided under each contract. Since contracts are county specific, only those residents living in the county in which the contract applies have access to the plans under that contract.
There are two different types of plans under the M1C heading -risk plans (e.g. Managed Care plansmainly Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Preferred Provider Organization plans, ProviderSponsored Organization plans and Private FFS plans) and cost plans. Risk and cost plans differ in that CMS provides a monthly payment to risk plans for each enrolled beneficiary, while with cost plans, CMS only pays the cost of services in excess of the standard Medicare FFS. Prior to the Medicare Modernization Act, however, most M1C plans were Managed Care plans. For the most part, standard Medicare FFS leaves the beneficiary with a large amount of risk, often without dental, vision, long-term care, preventative care, or prescription drug coverage. Parts A and B also require rather substantial deductables and co-payments and do not place a maximum on out-ofpocket expenses. Due to this increased exposure, nearly 90% of beneficiaries have some sort of supplemental coverage, either through Medicaid, Medigap, employer provided insurance, or through MA. For those enrolled in MA plans, they must pay the plan premium and also enroll in Medicare part B and pay the part B premium. Despite the extra premium, most MA plans offer significantly more benefits than the standard Medicare FFS. In fact, in our data set, 33% of MA plans charge no additional premium and still offer more benefits. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Due to the influx of Medicare beneficiaries, there has been increased attention paid to the MA market. This includes analyzing the enrollment decision process, the utilization process, as well as the overall welfare effects of privately provided Medicare health plans. Despite the increased awareness and applicability, there is no consensus as to how beneficiaries actually make their enrollment decisions. Initial studies, such as Atherly et al. (2004) and Dowd et al. (2003) , model this decision in a standard discrete choice framework (e.g. probit). But due to strong evidence suggesting that beneficiaries do not make informed decisions, the complete information assumption inherent in the standard discrete choice models has come under question. Some attempts to address these problems include Frank and Lamirand (2007) , Gilbride and Allenby (2006) , Loewenstein (1999) and Li (2006) , all of which integrate concepts from behavioral psychology (e.g. information overload or anxiety) into consumer decision processes. Li (2006) , however, is the only paper to use observational data rather than experimental or hypothetical survey data.
Although not strictly related to behavioral psychology, the motivation for our approach is similar. We acknowledge that beneficiaries are often not fully informed of all characteristics across all possible decisions; however, contrary to the approaches above, we believe that all beneficiaries are capable of being completely informed. The assumed computational capacity of beneficiaries is an important difference between the screening and search models. In a search context, the problem is that each person has a different cost of collecting information and therefore may not make an informed decision.
Search literature
Theoretically, consumer search first developed as an explanation for observed price differences in seemingly homogeneous product markets. For instance, assume that several buyers are all looking for the best price for some homogeneous good sold by several firms. 4 Everyone knows the distribution of prices but not the specific price of a given firm. If each buyer has some cost of going from one firm to another, and this cost is different across buyers, then under certain restrictions on the search cost and price distributions, there exists a price-dispersed equilibrium.
5 Using this theoretical background, Hong and Shum (2006) impose the equilibrium restrictions in order to estimate the search cost distribution using only price data. They apply this analysis to the online market for statistics textbooks and show that search may account for the observed price dispersion in this seemingly homogeneous product market.
If we further assume that firms have some marginal cost differences, then price-dispersed equilibria exist under more general search cost distributions.
6 Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) exploit this theoretical setup in their study of search costs and mutual funds. Similar to Hong and Shum (2006) , they exploit equilibrium relationships in order to estimate the search cost distribution in the market for S&P 500 index funds using both price and quantity (market share) data. They do so under three general sequential search settings. (1) They assume funds are homogeneous and that each fund is equally likely to be sampled, in which case cutoff search cost values come directly from the equilibrium restrictions of the model. (2) They allow for some vertical product differentiation where plans remain equally likely to be sampled. Here, given some additional marginal cost assumptions, search cost cutoffs are again estimated directly from equilibrium restrictions. (3) They consider homogeneous funds with unequal sampling probabilities, and estimate the parameters of an assumed search cost distribution using nonlinear least squares. This paper is particularly interesting as it integrates consumer search and product differentiation; however, as Hortacsu and Syverson indicate, they cannot consider taste heterogeneities along with search costs since their data do not provide an exogenous source of variation for the search cost distribution.
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The main goal in these empirical search models is to estimate the search cost distribution, usually in a structural model and usually in a nearly homogeneous good market, or to more formally model the mechanism by which certain consumers are more informed than others. There is currently little work, however, on the actual determinants of individual consumer search costs. Moreover, the data considered in these models do not allow for both taste differences across choices and heterogeneous search costs. This paper addresses both of these issues.
DATA
The data for individual plan characteristics come from the Medicare Health Plan Compare (MHPC) data set. This is a freely available data set collected by CMS. Since we use 2002 beneficiary demographic data, we use the beginning-of-year MHPC for 2002. We combine the county code data with the benefit structure data to get one data set consisting of the Medicare plan contract, the plan id, the county code from which this contract operates and the benefit structure of each plan. The full data set includes up to 38 different plan attributes for each plan under each contract, where there are 452 different plan/ contract combinations and 174 different contracts. Variable definitions and summary statistics are included in Table I , where we see that nearly 70% of plans offered some sort of hearing, vision or prescription drug coverage, while less than 30% offered any dental coverage. As mentioned previously, we also see the large range of premium, IHC costs, SNF costs and doctor co-pay. In premium alone, the incentive to search could exceed $300. Since all eligibles have access to the standard Medicare FFS, we treat this as the baseline utility that anyone can obtain for free. We normalize the FFS premium to $0, and we set the IHC equal to $13.53 per day for the first 60 days and the doctor or specialist co-payment to $25 as per the 2002 'Medicare and You' booklet.
For informed beneficiaries, we consider premium (in excess of the $54 for Part B coverage), prescription drug coverage, average doctor or specialist co-pay, vision services, dental services, hearing services, home health care coverage, physical exam coverage, IHC costs and SNF costs. We also combine general health education and acupuncture into one variable named 'extras'. These characteristics are commonly studied in the Medicare literature. Due to little variability across plans, we do not use out-of-network coverage, chiropractic care or emergency room coverage in our analysis. For uninformed beneficiaries, we assume they only observe premium, doctor and specialist co-pay and prescription drug coverage. These were chosen for two reasons.
(1) The knowledge and needs supplement indicates that the cost of medical services is the most important aspect to beneficiaries next to general Parts A and B services -premium and co-pay are the most easily observed out-of-pocket cost variables included in our analysis. (2) In the screening literature, there is strong evidence that prescription drug coverage is a major screening variable.
8 For these reasons, we use premium, co-pay and prescription drug coverage as our covariates for uninformed beneficiaries.
We then combine these plan characteristics with individual beneficiary characteristics from the 2002 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), Access to Care module. This contains demographic data such as age, income, race, self-reported health status and Medicare use, as well as whether the beneficiary is employed or not, 9 as summarized in Table II , for a cross-section of 16 409 beneficiaries. In order to characterize each beneficiary's plan choice set, we apply the following filters: (1) we exclude beneficiaries with unknown age À94 observations; (2) we exclude beneficiaries completing interviews in medical facilities (e.g. nursing homes) -1173 additional observations; (3) we exclude beneficiaries classified as anything other than 'aged, no ESRD' À2536 additional observations; (4) due to fundamental differences between, say, the choice of Medigap versus M1C plans, we follow Atherly et al. (2004) and exclude beneficiaries with any type of supplemental coverage besides M1C (e.g. Medigap, Medicaid, public health coverage or employer provided insurance) -9499 additional observations and (5) we exclude beneficiaries claiming to have HMO or GHP coverage but who do not have a contract offered in their area -218 additional observations.
Using the county code data, we match beneficiaries to a specific plan and choice set. We form the choice set by matching the contracts offered by county code with each beneficiary's county of residence. Matching beneficiaries to specific plans, however, is not as clear. The MCBS only has data on the contract under which the beneficiary's plan exists -not which plan was chosen. Therefore, we match plans to beneficiaries by analyzing the deviation between each plan's characteristics and the beneficiary's perceived plan characteristics.
10 For some beneficiaries, however, this still does not uniquely match them to one plan. In this case, we assume that beneficiaries choose the best plan in regard to premium, prescription drug coverage, co-pay, vision, dental, hearing, physical exam coverage, IHC costs and SNF costs, in this order.
11 Recall that we consider only the first three characteristics for uninformed eligibles as they are assumed to never see the remaining characteristics. If plans remain identical across these characteristics, we randomly assign one of the remaining plans. We lose another 655 observations who The survey asks questions about how much the beneficiary pays per month and what type of prescription drug coverage they receive. We use the answers to these questions to determine the 'distance' from the benefits available to the beneficiary and the benefits received by the beneficiary.
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These characteristics are sufficient to match beneficiaries to plans, so we ignore health education and acupuncture in our matching process.
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are under contracts that do not match the contracts available to them or who are matched to plans not offered under their original contract. 12 The final data set therefore consists of N 5 2234 beneficiaries, Most of these observations are those who have moved or switched plans throughout the year but who had a plan prior to moving.
SEARCH COSTS AND MEDICARE PLAN CHOICE
970 of which are enrolled in the basic Medicare FFS and the remaining enrolled in a Medicare health plan (managed care plan). From Table II , we see that a large portion of our sample has annual income between $5000 and $25 000, education at or below a high school diploma, good to excellent (selfreported) health status and few chronic diseases.
For data on search behavior, we use the beneficiary Knowledge and Needs survey. These variables explain whether a beneficiary contacted Medicare prior to choosing their plan, whether they accessed the internet, reviewed the plan quality charts and other similar activities. Summary statistics are included in Table III . This tells us how active beneficiaries are in finding information, where we see that only 6% claimed to have looked for payment information and only 5% claimed to have looked for benefit information. Over 43%, however, claimed to read and at least partially understand the 'Medicare and You' booklet.
To appropriately split beneficiaries into groups of informed and uninformed, we need to determine which avenues a beneficiary can take to gain information. From the data available, we determine 11 such avenues: (1) whether the beneficiary switched plans within the past year, (2-4) whether they are informed of Medicare payment, benefit or coverage information, (5) whether they are informed of HMO information, (6) whether they read the 'Medicare and You' booklet, (7-8) whether they looked at quality ratings or the plan information chart, (9) whether they called the Medicare hotline, (10) whether they visited the Medicare website (provided they have internet access) and (11) whether they have someone assisting them in their Medicare decisions. Out of these 11 categories, we see from Table IV that over 45% of our sample made no observable attempt to gain information. 13 Of the 600 that took The percentages given in Table IV are consistent across the subsets of beneficiaries choosing FFS and those choosing HMO coverage.
only one avenue, most of them read the 'Medicare and You' booklet. And since the booklet is fairly general and does not discuss individual plans, we assume that those beneficiaries who only read the booklet still most likely made an uninformed decision. We therefore assume that anyone taking one or less avenue to gain information is uninformed, leaving N 1 ¼ 627 informed beneficiaries and N 2 ¼ 1607 uninformed beneficiaries.
THE MODEL
There are i ¼ 1; . . . ; N beneficiaries choosing between j ¼ 1; . . . ; J i different health care plans, where each beneficiary has some search cost, c i 40, and where the numbers and types of plans available vary by zip code and county code. As mentioned previously, N is the sum of N 1 informed buyers and N 2 uninformed buyers. All N 2 uninformed beneficiaries know only a subset of plan characteristics as well as the maximum utility available to them if they decide to search, while the N 1 informed beneficiaries have full information on all plan characteristics. This type of information structure is similar to Sorensen (2001) , where buyers know the maximum utility available to them but must engage in costly search to match plans with utility values.
Everyone has information on some characteristics but must engage in costly search in order to become fully informed. In this sense, searching and making an informed decision are synonymous. Since utilities and search costs are heterogeneous across beneficiaries, not everyone finds it beneficial to search. Those that do not search therefore choose the best plan based on a subset of characteristics. This subset determines the baseline utility that buyers can attain with certainty and without search. Note that, since some attributes remain unknown without search, uninformed beneficiaries may select plans that, had they been informed, would not have offered the highest utility. The timing of the process is as follows:
1. Buyers form their own benefit of search, b i , determined by the difference between the maximum utility available to them through search and the maximum available without search. 2. Buyers decide to search or not, depending on their search cost c i . If c i ob i , then beneficiary i searches. 3. If beneficiary i is completely informed, they choose the highest utility available. Otherwise, they choose the plan offering the highest utility according to a subset of covariates.
Recall from Section 3 that the standard theoretical search model assumes buyers know the full distribution of utilities available but are ex ante uninformed about which plans offer which utilities. In a sequential setting, buyers would go from one plan to the next searching for the best deal and stop a Determined by the sum of 11 indicators: (1) whether the beneficiary switched plans within the past year; (2-4) whether they are informed of Medicare payment, benefit or coverage information; (5) whether they are informed of HMO information; (6) whether they read the 'Medicare and You' booklet; (7-8) whether they looked at quality ratings or the plan information chart; (9) whether they called the Medicare hotline; (10) whether they visited the Medicare website (provided theyhave internet access) and (11) whether they have someone assisting them in their Medicare decisions. Anyone with 1 or less such attempt to find information is assumed to be uninformed.
searching once the benefit to search is below their cost. The major differences between our 'all or nothing' search process and this standard theoretical search process are twofold. One, in our model, beneficiaries have knowledge of a subset of characteristics across all plans. Therefore, beneficiaries need not search in order to look at more than one plan -they must search in order to look at more characteristics. Two, if they search, they do so exhaustively. Search therefore has two effects on beneficiary behavior and utility: (1) the beneficiary becomes aware of plan attributes that would otherwise have a negative effect on their utility, and thus avoids the plan if such negative effects are sufficiently large; or (2) the beneficiary becomes aware of plan attributes that have a positive effect on their utility and will choose differently (relative to had they been uninformed) if such effects are sufficiently large. In either case, an informed decision yields a higher ex post utility than an uninformed decision. In this sense, the search process automatically dictates that an informed decision is no worse, but perhaps better, from a welfare standpoint than an uninformed decision. This is true for all beneficiaries and derives theoretically from the search process considered.
In the Medicare health plan market, the assumption of exhaustive search is more appropriate as often data that are available for one plan are available for many other plans at the same time. For instance, the Medicare website compares several plans across whatever characteristics are chosen, similar to other websites such as plan prescriber (www.planprescriber.com). The more likely decision may therefore be whether to search at all instead of whether to search one more time. To some extent, this search process is also data driven. We cannot allow for a fully sequential search model because we can never be sure where different beneficiaries have searched. Even if we knew how many plans someone looked at, there would be generally too many combinations of different plans to identify utility and search cost coefficients. As discussed in Section 4, we split beneficiaries into informed and uninformed groups based on how many avenues they took to gain information, taking one or less implies they are uninformed while taking two or more implies they are informed.
Utility specification
We allow for two separate utility specifications, one for informed and one for uninformed beneficiaries. In both cases, we adopt the standard random coefficient multinomial probit (RCMNP) model. 14 For informed buyers, the latent utility for beneficiary i is determined by
where x j ¼ ðx 1j ; . . . ; x K 1 j Þ 0 is the K 1 Â 1 vector of plan characteristics, K 1 is the number of plan characteristics relevant for informed beneficiaries, and e ij $ iid Nð0; 1Þ, independent of X. For uninformed eligibles, denote bỹ x j the subset of x j consisting of K 2 characteristics on which all beneficiaries are informed, with corresponding coefficientsb i . Therefore, the latent utility for (uninformed) beneficiary i is determined bỹ
Again,ẽ andx j are independent for all j andẽ ij $ iid Nð0; 1Þ. We also assume thatẽ and e are independent.
We specify the random coefficients for informed buyers as follows:
where z i is the D Â 1 vector of demographic variables, D is a D Â K 1 matrix of common coefficients, and V b is a K 1 Â K 1 covariance matrix. The analogous equation for uninformed beneficiaries is
whereD is now a D Â K 2 matrix of common coefficients, and Vb is a K 2 Â K 2 variance matrix.
14 One important justification of the RCMNP model is to avoid Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). See Athey and Imbens (2007) for more detail.
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Note that this approach allows for demographic and plan characteristic interactions as well as unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. We use demeaned values for demographic explanatory variables. This simplifies interpretation so that the constant termsrepresent marginal utilities for the average beneficiary. For instance, if x 1 is premium, then D 1 represents the marginal effect of premium for a beneficiary of average age, average income, average education and so forth.
Search rule
Since buyers know their maximum utilities prior to search, but not which plan offers which utility, the benefit from search is b i ¼ maxfu i1 ; :::; u iJ g À maxfũ i1 ; :::;ũ iJ g ð 5Þ This is just the difference between the potential utility available through costly search and the guaranteed utility everyone can obtain without searching. Since each beneficiary potentially observes different utility values, each b i also differs across eligibles. This benefit of search is also the minimum (for uninformed buyers) or maximum (for informed buyers) search cost. Denote these minima and maxima for each i beneficiary by m i and m i , respectively. The main focus of this paper is to explain the primary determinants of these critical search cost values. To do so, we specify the following functional forms:
where w i is a 1 Â M vector of demographics for both informed and uninformed beneficiaries. We assume the error terms, m i for informed andm i for uninformed, are iid with m i $ Nð0; s 2 Þ and m i $ Nð0;s 2 Þ. We identify search cost coefficients through two avenues. One, the level of information is observed in the data, as discussed in Section 4, so that beneficiaries are matched to one of the two information types. Two, we include in w i certain demographics that are excluded from z i , such as the number of helpers assisting the beneficiary and race, so that there is an exogenous source of variation within beneficiaries of a particular information structure. This provides the necessary independent variation between search and taste heterogeneities, as mentioned in Section 3. Our specification therefore introduces a second type of heterogeneity into the standard discrete choice model, allowing for both heterogeneity in taste, due to the random coefficients, as well as heterogeneity in information.
More generally, we assume a single search cost distribution from which all beneficiaries have some unobserved search cost. We make no restrictions on this distribution and instead restrict the minimum and maximum search costs (i.e. search cost cutoffs) to follow normal distributions. From these minima and maxima, and from our assumed search process discussed previously, we know on which side of these cutoffs each beneficiary lies. We can then determine, among uninformed beneficiaries, who is most likely to benefit from small information improvements. This tells us who needs the smallest push in order to become informed. Figure 1 shows a graphical exposition. The distribution itself represents the full, unconditional search cost distribution, while the lines, m a and m b , represent the mean estimated cutoff values for two uninformed beneficiaries (i.e. the minimum search costs). The true search costs, s a and s b , lie somewhere to the right of the respective minima. To better understand our results, assume that a given demographic component, w 1 , has the following relationship across the two beneficiaries: w 1a ow 1b . For instance, beneficiary b's income level exceeds that of beneficiary a. Further assume thatg 1 40, which in this case implies that income has a positive effect on uninformed beneficiaries' minimum search costs. Therefore, beneficiary b has a higher minimum search cost than beneficiary a, as depicted in the graph. It follows that beneficiary b is more likely to have a search cost closer to their cutoff than beneficiary a, and we interpret this to mean that beneficiary b is more likely to make an informed decision in response to a uniform decrease in all beneficiary search costs.
We can also think of this in terms of the benefit to search, in which case beneficiary a has a smaller benefit to search than beneficiary b. This again implies that, if we could lower the search costs of both people, beneficiary b would be more likely to search than beneficiary a. Since a given beneficiary would only search if the utility gain exceeds their search cost, 'becoming informed' is completely welfare improving (or at least not welfare decreasing).
Decision rule
To study the final decision rule, we denote by y i the plan chosen by beneficiary i. For y i ¼ j, we therefore know the following: To back out critical search costs, note that for uninformed buyers, all u ij are formed by taking the counterfactual -if beneficiary i were informed, then their utilities would be u ij ; . . . ; u iJ -and similarly for informed buyers.
ESTIMATION
To estimate utility and search cost coefficients, we use a Bayesian MCMC approach. We specify prior distributions for D,D, V b , Vb, g,g, s 2 ands 2 in order to obtain draws from the posterior distributions. We follow Athey and Imbens (2007) as well as Rossi et al. (1996) and Chib and Greenberg (1998) in our sampling algorithm. The basic idea is as follows: 15 1. Draw latent utilities for informed and uninformed beneficiaries, fu 1 ; . . . ; u N 1 g and fũ 1 ; . . . ;ũ N 2 g, respectively. Recall from Section 1, informed and uninformed utilities take the form of u ij ¼ x j b i þ e ij andũ ij ¼x jbi þẽ ij , respectively. Conditional on each set of parameters, utilities Figure 1 . Predicted minimum search costs for uninformed beneficiaries. This depicts the movement of a predicted minimum search cost from m a to m b and represents the effect of variables with positive search cost coefficients on the minimum search cost of a given beneficiary. The interpretation is that beneficiary b is more likely closer to their minimum search cost than beneficiary a, and therefore, beneficiary b needs less 'push' (probabilistically) to make an informed decision therefore follow a normal distribution with mean and variance provided in Appendix A. We obtain draws of each plan's utility for each beneficiary as follows: (1) draw the utility of the chosen option from a conditional normal distribution, truncated below by 0; and (2) draw the remaining utilities from a conditional normal distribution, truncated above by the utility of the chosen option. We then obtain draws of fu 11 ; . . . ; u 1J g, find the maximum of such draws and take the difference from this maximum and maxfũ 11 ; . . . ;ũ 1J g. This difference provides a draw of m 1 . 6. Draw search cost coefficients g andg. Given the minimum and maximum search costs, this step is essentially a regression of maximum and minimum search costs on demographic variables. Conditional on search costs, g andg therefore follow a normal distribution with mean and variance given in Appendix A. 7. Draw search cost variances s 2 ands 2 . Analogous to V b and Vb, search cost variances follow an inverted gamma distribution conditional on previous parameter draws with shape and scale provided in Appendix A.
In each step, we draw from distributions conditional on the previous coefficient draws. We adopt the standard discrete choice framework and study utilities in relation to a base option available to all beneficiaries. Since all beneficiaries have the option of FFS, we use basic Medicare FFS as the default plan. This means that our plan characteristic variables, x j andx j , are actually differenced by the level of each characteristic offered under the standard Medicare FFS. Similarly, e ij andẽ ij represent differenced error terms. This normalizes the basic Medicare FFS plan to zero utility and implies that all other latent utilities are relative to this base level.
We follow the steps above for 50 000 draws. For D,D, V b and Vb, we drop the first 10 000 draws and take each 20th draw to form the posterior distributions. In this case, the Geweke Separated Partial Means (GSPM) 17 test yields p-values above 0.5 for most coefficients and above 0:1 for all coefficients, suggesting our simulators successfully converged to their respective posterior distributions. Since draws of search cost coefficients depend strongly on utility coefficients and variances, we drop an additional 10 000 draws for these coefficients. This amounts to dropping the first 20 000 draws for g,g, s 2 ands 2 . Similar convergence diagnostics yield p-values above 0:3 for both informed and uninformed search cost coefficients. 16 We draw the utility for the chosen option using the inverse transform method and draw the remaining utilities using the accept/ reject method.
RESULTS
For all sets of coefficients, we follow Rossi et al. (1996) and indicate the probability of coefficients being the same sign as the posterior mean with a Ã for at least 80% probability and ÃÃ with at least 90% probability. This gives us some feel for which coefficients are sufficiently far from zero.
Utility coefficients
Results for informed beneficiaries are summarized in Table V , and results for uninformed beneficiaries are summarized in Table VI. 18 These tables present the posterior means for D andD, respectively, with posterior standard deviations in parentheses. As mentioned in Section 5.1, all demographic variables are demeaned so that the constant term represents the average effect across all beneficiaries. Also note that IHC, SNF care and premium are measured in $100s while doctor and specialist co-pay is measured in $10s. Therefore, for informed beneficiaries, the constant for premium implies that the average informed beneficiary's expected utility decreases by 0:193 as the plan's premium increases by $100, all else constant. Similarly, expected utility for an average informed beneficiary decreases by 0:180 in response to a $100 per day increase to stay in an SNF.
The remaining coefficients represent interaction terms between beneficiary demographics and plan characteristics. For instance, consider the coefficient for the plan characteristic titled 'Extra' and the demographic variable ' Chronic Diseases'. The posterior mean of 0.042 implies that beneficiaries with more chronic diseases place more value on health education and acupuncture services than beneficiaries with fewer chronic diseases. Similarly, beneficiaries with better self-reported health status care more about such services than those reporting poor health (recall larger values of this variable indicate poorer health).
From Table VI we see that posterior means are generally further away from zero than for informed beneficiaries with smaller relative variances. The constant term still represents the average effect across uninformed beneficiaries. The most important difference is premium, on which uninformed beneficiaries put far more weight than informed beneficiaries. This makes sense as premium is one of the more easily observed plan characteristics. Therefore, uninformed beneficiaries are much more attracted to lower premium plans. Specifically, a $100 increase in premium or a $10 increase in co-pay decreases the expected utility of an average uninformed beneficiary by 3:541 and 0:352, respectively. For the interaction terms, we see that uninformed beneficiaries in good health tend to value prescription drug coverage more than beneficiaries reporting poor health. Also note the large negative effect of co-pay for beneficiaries with diabetes. This implies that uninformed beneficiaries with diabetes are more negatively affected by a high doctor and specialist co-pay than those without diabetes, which is intuitively clear as these beneficiaries are more likely to need such visits. As we discuss further in the next section, this effect for diabetes has important implications for search behavior.
Information structure
We can now discuss search behavior and determinants of critical search costs, the main focus of the paper. Posterior means of minimum search cost coefficients for uninformed beneficiaries are included in Table VII . These minimum search costs represent the smallest possible search cost a beneficiary could have had in order to still have made an uninformed decision. The coefficients themselves represent marginal effects on these minima. Recall from our discussion of Figure 1 that, for uninformed beneficiaries, a larger minimum search cost implies that this beneficiary is more likely to have a search cost close to their minimum and vice versa for smaller minimum search costs. Specifically, the positive coefficient for age means that being 1 year older increases the expected minimum search cost by 0:005. Similarly, moving up one income bracket increases the expected minimum search cost by 0:010. Self-reported health status and race also have positive effects. Together, these results imply that older, higher income, African American beneficiaries with poor selfreported health status are more likely to utilize easier access to information. Conversely, employed beneficiaries with diabetes and extra assistance are less likely to utilize improved access to information. For employed beneficiaries, this is intuitively clear as they may have some nonmedicare coverage through their employer. This also makes sense for those with extra household assistance and diabetes as these beneficiaries are more likely to have someone making their decision for them and therefore much less likely to search. Recall that this analysis is conditional on being uninformed. Therefore, this does not imply that someone with diabetes benefits less from searchonly someone with diabetes who was observed to make an uninformed decision.
Although our policy discussion pertains mainly to uninformed beneficiaries, we include results for informed beneficiaries in Table VIII . In this case, coefficients represent marginal effects for maximum search costs -the largest possible search cost a person could have had in order to still make an informed decision. Our interpretation in this case is slightly different. Here, a lower maximum search cost implies that these beneficiaries must have relatively low search costs in order to have made an informed decision. This also implies that such beneficiaries were closer to making an uninformed decision. Therefore, since the posterior mean for diabetes is negative and sufficiently far from zero, informed beneficiaries with diabetes are more likely closer to making an uninformed decision than those without diabetes. A similar interpretation holds for informed beneficiaries with more chronic diseases. This is somewhat surprising as we might initially expect diabetics to have a very large benefit to search. Intuitively, however, this result derives primarily from taste differences among diabetics, where we see I. M. MCCARTHY AND R. TCHERNIS from Table VI that uninformed beneficiaries with diabetes place substantial weight on co-pay and prescription drug coverage. Therefore, utility differences between informed and uninformed are smaller for those with diabetes as opposed to, for instance, someone with a strong education. In this case, our assumption that uninformed beneficiaries still observe co-pay is important. If we eliminated co-pay from the uninformed beneficiaries' information sets, the benefit to search for diabetics would be substantially higher.
As mentioned previously, the policy implication for our model is that older, higher income, African American beneficiaries with lower self-reported health status need less help to go from uninformed to informed. Note that this interpretation holds for uninformed beneficiaries and is therefore conditional on the information structure. This does not mean that such a beneficiary is more or less likely to be informed. It means that, conditional on being uninformed, these types of beneficiaries need less of a push in order to make an informed decision. This has important policy implications if we imagine wanting to target beneficiaries most likely to use new information. This result could not be attained, for instance, with a standard reduced form probit model using informed or uninformed as the dependent variable.
19 Such a model would only determine which types of beneficiaries are more likely to be informed or uninformed -not who is closer to being informed conditional on being uninformed. This paper introduces consumer search into a discrete choice model while accounting for horizontal taste differentiation across plans. A major underlying premise is that information structures are due both to general demographic characteristics as well as taste differences. We estimate a RCMNP model where beneficiaries are either informed or uninformed and have different decision processes accordingly. Using these utility coefficients, we model a consumer search process and estimate critical search cost coefficients.
Our analysis provides two main contributions, one of which is more econometric and the last more policy oriented. One, due to strong differences across coefficients, there is evidence that information heterogeneities are an important determinant of plan choice. Ignoring such heterogeneities may have important implications. Two, we address these informational heterogeneities with a consumer search model while still accounting for horizontal taste differentiation. This assumes that all beneficiaries are capable of understanding the health plans available to them, but it may be overly costly for some of them to do so. This allows us to study how close beneficiaries must have been to making an informed or uninformed decision. For example, our search cost coefficients imply that higher income beneficiaries are most likely closer to their threshold search cost values than lower income beneficiaries, while beneficiaries with more assistance are more likely to have search costs well away from the cutoff. This implies that high income, older beneficiaries with little household assistance will benefit more from easier access to information than younger, low-income beneficiaries with more assistance.
APPENDIX A: GIBBS SAMPLER ALGORITHM
Denote by Nðt; m; s 2 Þ a normal distribution truncated below by t and by Nðt; m; s 2 Þ a normal distribution truncated above by t. We consider the following conjugate (and diffuse) priors: 
3. Draw common coefficients:
4. Draw variance matrices: 
2. Estimate benefit to search as well as minimum and maximum search costs:
3. Draw search cost coefficients: Table CI . A common problem with the Poisson model, however, is that it underfits dispersion in the dependent variable. To account for this, we run a Negative Binomial model, also included in Table CI . Although coefficients essentially do not change, a likelihood-ratio test for a ¼ 0 concludes that there is significant evidence of overdispersion, suggesting a preference for the Negative Binomial model. The interpretations essentially do not change across the two models. We see that age is positively related to gaining information, age (in tens of years) squared is negatively related, and that education and the number of chronic diseases are positively related. More specifically, we see from the factor changes that becoming 1 year older increases the expected number of information resources used by a factor of about 1.2. Similarly, increasing education by one level (e.g. going from some college to gaining Results are from a zero/one dependent variable equal to one if beneficiary engaged in two or more activities to gain information and zero otherwise. SEARCH COSTS AND MEDICARE PLAN CHOICE a college degree) or having one more chronic disease increases the expected number of information resources used by a factor of 1.07 and 1.11, respectively. As a robustness check, we also form an indicator variable for whether the beneficiary is informed or not, as per our definition of informed in Section 4. We do this because our consumer search process similarly splits buyers into two groups, and we want to ensure that imposing this type of cutoff does not drive our results. From the probit model, also included in Table CI , we see that for sign and significance, most coefficients do not change. We conclude that any major differences between our search cost coefficients and the probit or count model coefficients are probably not attributed to our assignment of beneficiaries into one of only two groups.
APPENDIX D: VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRICES FOR UTILITY COEFFICIENTS
The covariance matrix for informed and uninformed utility coefficients is given in Tables DI and DII. 
